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339 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. 2003)
L Fats
On March 7, 1994, at approximately 7:00 p.m., Major Spencer Guerry
("Guerry"), the DeputyPolice Chief for the Cityof Georgetown, South Carolina,
observed a Honda Prelude being driven with an expired Colorado license plate.
Guerry stopped the Honda, approached it, and asked the driver, David ill
(Hifll"), for his driver's license and vehicle registration. Hill provided Guerry
with his registration but was unable to produce his license. Guerry returned to
his vehicle and radioed the information to headquarters.'
Before headquarters was able to get back in touch with Guerry, Guerry
again approached Ill's Honda and instructed Hil to exit his vehicle.2 Hill then
shot Guerry in the face and drove away.' Guerry managed to use the radio
attached to his uniform to call for help." A tape recording made at headquarters
indicated that Guerry "muttered" words including "6-9" and "-eh shot me."'
Medical personnel arrived and transported Guerryto the Medical University of
South Carolina, where he died a few days later.'
Driving the Honda back to his home, HIll stopped and picked up his
girlfriend, Wendy Richardson ("Richardson"). The two of them drove to his
parent's home. Hill abandoned his car in a ditch with his mother and Richardson
following behind.
7
Officers located and searched Hill's home and proceeded to the home of
Hill's parents Bythe time the officers arrived at Hill's parents' home, Hill had
abandoned his vehicle, returned with his mother and Richardson, and left again.9
Officers advised Hill's parents and Richardson to encourage Hill to contact
authorities.'




5. Id The numbers "6-9" are the first two numbers in the code "6-9-1" that is the dispatch
for headquarters. Id
6. Id
7. Hi 339 F.3d at 190.
8. Id at 190-91.
9. Id at 191.
10. Id
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Shortly after the authorities left Hill's parents' home, Fill returned covered
in mud." After showering and cleaning his hands with Clorox, ill phoned the
police and reported his car stolen.12 Investigators responded and arrested HiM 13
At headquarters, Hill waived his Mranda rights and began to talk with investiga-
tors.14 Not believing his story, investigators probed Hill about the "precise
timing" of the events he described." il stopped the interview and requested
a lawyer.
16
On April 20,1994, Hil was indicted for the murder of Guerry, and the State
announced it would seek the death penalty. 7 Due to the publicity surrounding
the case, the court sequestered the jury for the trial's duration." At trial, during
the State's case-in-chief, the State presented significant evidence pointing toward
HIFl's guilt and rested its case after four days.
At trial, Hil's version of the events of March 7 had changed significantly
since his initial interview.2" Hill finished his testimonyat approximately4:30 p.rm
11. Id
12. Id
13. H 339 F.3d at 191. Hillwas taken to headquarters where investigators performed tests
on his hands. Id The tests revealed that Hill had recently fired a firearm. Id
14. Id The story Hill related to investigators'was very different than the story il related
at trial. Id Hill told investigators that he and Richardson had fought earlier in the day. Id
Afterwards, ill walked from his home to his parents' home where he fell asleep reading a magazine
outside bya shed. Id Hill recalled waiting up, entering his parents' home and his mother informing
him that the authorities were looking for him. Id HiM then called the police. Id
15. Id
16. Id Later that evening, investigators discovered Hill's Honda abandoned in a ditch. Id
Visiting an Exxon station, the investigators recovered a credit card receipt time-stamped at 6.00
p.m. on March 7, 1994, bearing Hill's signature. Id This was one hour before the shooting. Id
17. Id; seS.C. CODE ANN. S 16-3-26 (Supp. 2002) (stating the punishment for murder and
the procedures for seeking the death penalt}.
18. H4 339 F.3d at 191.
19. Id
20. Id Hl testified that he and Johnny Cribb ("Cribb") were in the Honda at the time
Guerry was shot. Hi related that he owed Cribb $16,000 because of a "drug deal gone awry." Hill
stated that Cuibb shot Guerry. HE continued to testify that earlier that day he had traveled to
Pawleys Island, South Carolina, t buymarijuana. On his way back to Georgetown, il stopped
and picked up Steve Blankemhip ("Blankenship"), an acquaintance of both himself and Cribb. ill
stated that Blnkenship entered his car, threatened him with a pistol, and forced him to drive to a
Ramada Inn near Georgetown. Next, Blankenship removed Hill's gun from the glove compart-
ment. Wen Bhakensh and Il arrived at the Ramada Inn, theymet Cribb. Bhnensi gave
Cribb both weapons. Hilltestified that Cribb told him they had "unfinished business to take care
of and entered the Honda. Gribb pointed the gun at Hill's head. Hill testified that he was in-
structed to drive to his home and they were on the way there when Gueny stopped them. Il
related that Cribb was hiding in the backseat and that when Guerry approached the vehicle Cribb
leaned forward and shot Guerry with Iffls handgun. After the shooting, Cuibb instructed HiFl to
discharge the handgun into the woods. According to M Cuibb left with Blankenship, and Hil
drove the Honda home. Id at 191-92.
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on Saturday, October 28, 1994.21 The next defense witness scheduled to testify
was Dr. Stephen Cain ("Dr. Cain"). 2 Due to unforeseeable events, Dr. Cain was
not able to arrive in Georgetown on Saturday afternoon or evening.23 The
defense sought a continuance until Mondayin order to allow Dr. Cain to testify,
which the court denied.24 The defense rested and dosing arguments were made
on Saturday night." On Sunday morning the jury received its instructions and
found Hill guilty of murder in forty-five minutes. 6
During the sentencing phase, the defense called three experts "who testified
that Fl suffered from a treatable neuro-chemical disorder."2" After dosing
arguments, the jury returned a verdict recommending that Hill be sentenced to
death. Accepting the jurys recommendation, the trial court imposed the death
sentence." Hl directly appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of South
Carolina. 0 "[Tjhat court upheld Hill's conviction and death sentence."3' The
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 2
Next, Hill filed an Application for Post-Conviction Relief ("PCR"). After
a four-dayevidentiary hearing, the PCR was dismissed. 4 The Supreme Court of
South Carolina refused to review the PCR order, and the United States Supreme
Court again denied certiorari."
Hill filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District
Court for South Carolina. 6 After a thorough evaluation, a magistrate judge
recommended that the petition be dismissed. The district court adopted the
21. Idat 192.
22. Id Dr. Cain was an expert witness from Wisconsin who was scheduled to fly in from
Nevada for the tria Id at 192, 195.
23. Id; sie rfra note 61.







30. H4 339 F.3d at 192; se S.C CODE ANN. S 16-3-25 (Supp. 2002) (prescribing review by
the supreme court of the imposition of the death penalty).
31. Hdl 339 F.3d at 192 (citing State v. HIll, 501 S.E.2d 122, 122 (S.C 1998)).
32. Id (citing Hilly. South Carolina, 525 U.S. 1043,1043 (1998) (mem.) (denying certioran)).
33. Id Subsequently, ill amended his PCR "to assert additional claims for relief." Id at 192
n.2. The PCR cited is the PCR as amended. Id
34. Id at 192.
35. Id (citing Hl v. MaynaMrd, 537 US. 979, 979 (2002) (mem.) (denying certioran)).
36. Id at 193. HIl amended his petition for habeas relief severaltimes. Id at 193 n.3. The
petition referred to is the petition as amended. Id
37. Hi4 339 F.3d at 193; sie 28 US.C S 636(b) (2000) (allowing a district court to refer a
2003]
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magistrate's recommendation, dismissed Hill's petition, and declined to issue a
Certificate of Appealablity ("(nA").
Despite the district court's refusal to issue a (DA, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued Hill a GOA for several habeas claims. 9
The claims certified were the following: (1) that the trial court violated the Sixth
Amendment in its refusal to grant Hill a continuance ("the continuance claim");
(2) that the number of officers in uniform in both the courtroom and at the
courthouse, pursuant to Hdba~xk v F6yrz, 4  violated Hill's right to a fair trial ("the
Hdbmrxk claim"); (3) that the district court erred in not holding a hearing to allow
for discovery on the Hdbrok claim (the "discovery claim"); and (4) that Hill's
counsel were ineffective (the "ineffective assistance of counsel ("IAC') claim").'
The court addressed each in turn.
I. Hdig
The Fourth Crcuit rejected each of the four claims upon which it granted
a COA and affirmed the judgment of the district court.42 The court found that
none of the state court's adjudications of Hill's claims were "contrary to" or an
"unreasonable application of" clearly established federal law.43 H-ill's claims,
therefore, were properly decided by the district court."
In. A nzbsis
A. The Swrlmd fReuew
Basden L# instructs that a federal circuit court review de novo a district
court's " 'decision on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on a state court
record.' "4' Additionally, when a district court refuses to hold an evidentiary
petition for habeas corpus to a magistrate judge).
38. HA 339 F.3d at 193; st 28 U.S.C S 2253(c)(1) (2000) (stating that "(ulnless a circuit
justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of
appeals"; part of AEDPA).
39. HiJ 339 F.3d at 193.
40. 475 U.S. 560 (1986).
41. HA, 339 F.3d at 193; Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 570-71 (1986) (observing that
having too many uniformed officers in a courtroom can "pose (a threat] to a defendant's chances
of receiving a fair trial").
42. H4, 339 F.3d at 203.
43. Id at 197,199,202; s&28 U.S.C S 2254(d) (2000) (stating that a federal court mayaward
relief to a claim only if it was "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application of" clearly established
federal law, part of AEDPA).
44. Hi14 339 F.3d at 203.
45. 290 F.3d 602 (2002).
46. HM4 339 F.3d at 193 (quoting Basden v. Lee, 290 F.3d 602,608 (4th Cr. 2002)); Bzde,
290 F.3d at 608 (recognizing the standard of review for petitions of writs of habeas corpus based
[Vol. 16:1
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hearing or to authorize discovery, the state court decision is reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard.7
Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA"), federal courts can only issue a writ of habeas corpus if the state's
adjudication of a claim resulted in a decision that: (1) was "contrary to, or in-
volved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as deter-
mined by the Supreme Court of the United States;" or (2) "resulted in a decision
that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding."4" The Supreme Court ex-
plained in Wdiia v Ta)1o'49 that state action is "contrary to" clearly established
federal law when it results in a decision that is contrary to a conclusion the
Supreme Court reached on a question of law, or when a state court reaches a
decision contrary to a decision the Supreme Court has reached on a set of
materially indistinguishable facts."0 In deciding what is an "unreasonable applica-
tion," the Court has held that" '[u]nder the unreasonable application clause, a
federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct
governing legal principle from [the] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies
that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.' ""' Additionally, under 28 U.S.C
S 2254(e)(1), a state court's findings of fact are afforded a " 'presumption of
correctness'" which a petitioner can rebut with" 'clear and convincing evidence.'
"52
B. The atim (aim
In his petition for habeas corpus, Hfill asserted, "that the trial court violated
his Sixth Amendment right to present his defense to the indictment in refusing
to grant a continuance from Saturday evening until Monday morning so that he
could introduce Dr. Cain's testimony and an enhanced version of Guerry's final
radio transmission.""' At 5:40 p.m. on Friday, October 27, 1994, the State had
on state court claims).
47. H4 339 F.3d at 193 (citing Thomas v. Taylor, 170 F.3d 466,474-75 (4th Cir. 1999)).
48. Id; 28 U.S.C § 2254(d) (setting the standard for federal application of a habeas petition
from a state court claim, part of AEDPA).
49. 529 US. 362 (2000).
50. Hi 339 F3d at 193-94 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)); see Taior 529 US. at 412-13 (discussing the "contrary to" clearly
established federal law standard set forth in 28 U.S.C S 2254(d)).
51. Hi/l, 339 F.3d at 194 (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Taio, 529 US. at 413 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
52. Id (quoting 28 U.S.C S 2254(e)(1)).
53. Id; see Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 856-57 (1975) (reciting that pursuant to the




exhausted its available witness list and sought an overnight recess to accommo-
date its final four witnesses who were not available until Saturday." Court was
recessed until 9:00 a.m."s Hill's lawyers "had anticipated that the State's case-in-
chief would last at least through Saturday." 6 As a result of their prediction, Il l's
counsel had not planned on beginning their case-in-chief until Monday
morning.
The defense proposed that Guerry, in his final transmission after being shot,
actually said "they shot me" rather than "-eh shot me" as the prosecution
alleged." Hill's counsel retained Dr. Cain, a forensic tape analyst, to enhance the
last transmission of Guerry. 9 Dr. Cain's testimonywas to "establish the founda-
tion for admission of the enhanced recording, which Hl hoped would convince
the jurythat Guerryhad said 'they shot me.' "0 Due to circumstances beyond
his control, Dr Cain could not be in court on Saturday.61
The defense moved for a continuance until Monday morning.62 The court
initiallyreserved ruling on the motion for continuance.63 The State rested its case
around noon, and by 4:40 p.m. the defense had exhausted its list of available
witnesses.6 The defense renewed its motion for a continuance.65 "The cort
denied the one-day continuance, stating that it: 'simply cannot wait until Monday
morning. It is Saturday. According to my[watch] it is approximatelytwenty-two
[until] five, and the court declines to recess the trial until Monday morning.' -
Hill's counsel rested.'




58. Id This argument supported defense counsel's allegation that Cribb was in the car with
H the night of the shooting. Id
59. Id
60. HA 339 F.3d at 194.
61. Id at 195. On Frida, October 27, Hill's counsel contacted Dr. Cain in Nevada. Id Dr.
Cain told i's lawyers he would be completing his business and flying out Fridaynight or Saturday
morning. Id Dr. Cain purchased his airline ticket, d fter purchasing the t Dr. Cain's
assistant became violetly sick and, as a result, Dr. Cain was unable to leave Nevada. Id Dr. Cain
contacted Hill's defense team and informed them he would not be able to be there on Saturday.
Id
62. Id Dr. Cain called defense counsel on Saturday morning, told them that the condition








In his direct appeal to the Supreme Court of South Carolina, il argued
that the denial of his motion for a continuance interfered with his Sixth Amend-
ment right to present a defense.68 The court rejected this claim relying on State
vBabb.69 In his petition for habeas relief in the district court, Hill renewed his
argument.70 The district court rejected this claim as procedurally defaulted
because the Supreme Court of South Carolina had relied on state law." The
Fourth Circuit issued a (XA on this claim, but because the state's resolution of
the claim was neither "contraryto" nor an "unreasonable application of" clearly
established federal law, the court declined to issue habeas relief.'
Within the guise of his continuance claim i raised several subissues.73
First, ill asserted that the district court was mistaken in deciding that his claim
had been procedurally defaulted.4 Second, i argued "that there was no state
court adjudication 'on the merits,' and that [the court] should therefore review
the Continuance claim de novo."' Finally, -il argued that he was entitled to
habeas relief because the trial court denied his Sixth Amendment right to present
a defense.76
The Fourth Circuit found that the district court erred when it decided that
Hil's continuance claim was procedurallydefaulted." In this case, the state court
did not decide the claim based on a procedural rule, but instead, "considered the
merits of the claim, ruling that, under South Carolina law, the 'denial of [a]
motion for continuance will not be disturbed absent clear abuse of discretion
resulting in prejudice.'' The state court did not determine that ill procedurally
defaulted but rejected the claim wholly on its merits.' Thus, federal review was
not barred."
68. Id
69. Id; seeState v. Babb, 385 S.E.2d 827, 829 (S.C 1989) (standing for the proposition that
absent clear abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice, a denial of a motion for continuance will not
be disturbed).
70. H4 339 F.3d at 195.
71. Id
72. Id at 195, 197.
73. Id at 195.
74. Id
75. Id
76. HU 339 F.3d at 195.
77. Id at 196.
78. Id (quoting HiI 501 S.E.2d at 128) (alteration in origin.
79. Id




2. De Now Reew
Hill argued that the court should review his continuance claim de novo.1
Hill claimed that, because the state court onlyreferred to state law when resolv-
ing the claim, it failed to "adjudicate [it] on the merits." 2 The United States
Supreme Court has held that "a state court mayadjudicate a claim 'on the merits'
without relying on or citing Supreme Court precedents." 3 In this case, the court
concluded that the state court resolved the issue on the merits even if it did not
cite federal law.4
3. Den c qSixth Anu Ri t to P et D e
A defendant must satisfytwo elements in order to succeed on a claim "that
a trial court violated the Constitution in refusing to grant a continuance."" First,
the defendant must prove that the trial court abused its discretion in choosing to
deny the defendant's claim.86 In Urfr v Saraf!*" the United States Supreme
Court stated that a" 'matter of continuance is traditionally within the discretion
of the trial judge,' a trial court is not entitled to deny a continuance because of a
'myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for
delay.' "88 Second, the defendant must establish that the trial court's ruling was
erroneous and prejudiced his defense.89
Because the court could not determine whether the state court used abuse
of discretion or prejudice as its rationale for denying relief, the Fourth Circuit
examined the record to determine if the state court's rejection of the continuance
claim was "contrary to" or involved an "unreasonable application" of federal
law'9  Additionally, the Fourth Crcuit concluded that the treatment of the
defense team was inequitable in light of the fact that the prosecution was granted
the continuance it requested.91 The Fourth Circuit noted that the trial court's
refusal to grant the continuance appears to have been arbitrarily made and the
81. Id
82. Hid, 339 F.3d at 196.
83. Id; see Earlyv. Packer, 537 US. 3, 7-8 (2002) (finding that a pplying AEDPA deference
to a state court decision that was resolved without citing controlling federal precedent is a claim
adjudicated on the merits).
84. H! 339 F.3d at 196.
85. Id
86. Id
87. 376 US. 575 (1964).
88. Hill, 339 F.3d at 196 (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 US. 575, 589 (1964)).
89. Id at 196-97; seeUnied States v. Colon, 975 F.2d 128, 130 (4th Gr. 1992) (finding that
the trial court's refusal to grant a continuance prejudiced the Government's case).




court's onlyjustification was that it "simply[could not] wait until Mondaymom-
ing."92 The Fourth Crcuit found that although il's request for a continuance
was justifiable; it was denied in the name of expeditiousness."
In spite of this evidence, the Fourth Crcuit concluded that Hill failed to
show he suffered prejudice from the trial court's ruling.94 Dr. Cain, at the PCR
proceeding, testified that the enhanced tape would not resolve the issue of the
garbled language.95 The PCR court found that both the original and the en-
hanced tapes were "indecipherable." Concluding that neither Dr. Cain's
testimony nor the enhanced tape would have aided ill's defense, the court
determined that the state court's rejection of Hill's continuance claim was neither
"contrary to" nor an "unreasonable application of" clearly established federal
law.
97
C 7he Holbrook and Discery (Iain
Hill argued that he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial because
the number of uniformed police officers improperlysuggested to the jurythat he
was guilty.9 Alternatively, Hill contended in his discovery claim that the district
court erred in not allowing him to develop the record, through discovery or an
evidentiary hearing, regarding the number of police officers present during trial
to show that their presence interfered with his right to a fair trial." The Fourth
Circuit issued a (DA on both claims.W
1. Holbrook (aim
Hill first contended that during jury selection the number of uniformed
officers present in the courtroom prejudiced him by "improperly suggesting to




96. HAl, 339 F.3d at 197. The PCR court's finding of fact, under AEDPA, is entitled to a
presumption of correctness. S&e28 US.C S 2254(e)(1) (2000) (statingthat a state court's determina-
tion of a factual issue in a proceeding instituted bya writ of habeas corpus is presumed correct; part
of AEDPA).
97. HAll, 339 F.3d at 197; see Gardner v. Barnett, 199 F.3d 915, 920 (7th CAr. 1999) (denying
relief because refusal to grant a continuance did not affect the verdict when the excluded testimony
would not have aided the defense).
98. Hi4 339 F.3d at 197-98; sw Withrow v. Larkin, 421 US. 35, 46 (1975) (stating that the
right of the accused to a fair trial is an essential requirement of due process).
99. Hidl, 339 F.3d at 198. MFl wanted to utilize videotape recordings of the trial to establish




the jurythat he was guilty." 1' On Tuesday, October 24, during a hearing on the
issue, Hill maintained that the number of officers in the hallways of the court-
house caused the juryto walk through a veritable "gauntlet" of law enforcement
officers before being able to enter the courtroom.10 2 Second, ill contended that
"the presence of security officers in the courtroom could unfairly prejudice the
jury."13 When questioned at the hearing, Ill admitted that not all of the people
in the hallways were officers, some were bailiffs and prosecution staff.0 4 Addi-
tionally, not all of the officers in the courtroom were uniformed. " For example,
the officer next to the judge wore a suit.1" The trial court rejected Hill's conten-
tion that the presence of uniformed officers made his trial unfair."'
On direct appeal, in support of his assertion that uniformed officers at his
trial's guilt phase violated his constitutional right to a fair trial, Hill's counsel
asked the Supreme Court of South Carolina to allow therto subpoena television
videos that had been produced by several local stations during the trial."'
Pursuant to Rule 605 of the South Carolina Appellate Rules of Procedure, the
court declined to authorize such discovery.1 9 The court rejected Hill's Hac.bnxk
claim because Hill was unable to show that he suffered from "actual or inherent
prejudice from the presence of uniformed law officers."" The district court
reasoned that an evidentiary hearing and discovery on the point of the relevance
of the videotapes "would not have aided any relevant evidence not already
contained within the record" and denied ill's petition." The district court
concluded that on the Hdbrook issue the state court's decision was neither




103. Id Hill recounted that two uniformed officers sat next to Guerry's widow during trial,
one stood next to the trial judge, and another stood in a comer of the courtroom. Id
104. Id
105. Hid, 339 F.3d at 198.
106. Id
107. Id
108. Id at 198-99.
109. Id at 199; sw S.C APP. Cr. R. 605 (stating that in most instances recording in the
courtroom is prohibited).
110. H14 339 F.3d at 199.
111. Id The district court also ruled in the alternative that Hill was barred from using the
videotapes in federal court because the state court had refused to allow them based on a state
procedural rule. Id at 199 n.13. The Fourth Circuit declined to address this point because it found
that, regardless, Hill failed to make the requisite showing to obtain discovery or an evidentiary
hearing in a federal habeas proceeding. Id
112. Id at 199.
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The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that the state court's
decision was not a violation of 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d).' The court noted that a
defendant is " 'entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the
basis of the evidence introduced at trial.' "114 Applying this principle, the Su-
preme Court has determined that" 'a roomful of uniformed and armed police-
men might pose [a threat] to a defendant's chances of receiving a fair trial.' "11
To determine if a courtroom full of officers at a criminal trial is prejudicial and,
therefore, unconstitutional, a court must determine if there was" 'an unaccept-
able risk.., of impermissible factors coming into play.' "116 The reviewing court
must assess the courtroom scene to establish if the jury was inherently preju-
diced.
17
ill relied on Woods vu DuLi."' In ThW, a highly publicized murder trial,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that approxi-
mately forty-five uniformed prison guards were present as spectators during
much of the trial.'19 In Ill's case, although highly publicized, the record failed
to establish the number of officers present at trial.2° The officers who were
present were spread throughout the courtroom and the jury could have believed
that they were waiting to testify.' The Fourth Circuit failed to find that Hill's
circumstances rose to the level of inherent prejudice that could threaten a fair
trial and, consequently, the state court's decision on iffll's HdbAxk claim was
neither "contrary to" nor an "unreasonable application of" clearly established
federal law.'
2. Discery CLim
ill argued that if the current record was not sufficient to support a
Hdbrook claim, then he was entitled to develop the record further through
discovery.'23 The district court, reasoning that "introduction of the videotapes
113. Id; see 28 US.C S 2254(d) (2000) (setting out the guidelies for a federal court to hear
a state claim on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus; part of AEDPA).
114. Hi, 339 F.3d at 199 (quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978)).
115. Id at 199 (alteration in originaD (quoting Hdbr, 475 U.S. at 570-71).
116. Id (quotingHdbmrk, 475 US. at 570).
117. Id
118. Idat200;seeWoodsv.Dugger,923F.2d 1454,1460 (11th Cr. 1991) (ruling that"pretial
publicity combined with the large number of uniformed spectators rose to the level of inherent
prejudice, thereby depriving the petitioner of a fair trial").
119. H94 339 F.3d at 200.
120. Id
121. Id;seeUnited States v. Elder, 90 F.3d 111O, 1131 (6th Cr. 1996) (denying relief because
the uniformed officers were spread throughout the room).




would not have aided any relevant evidence not already contained within the
record," denied Hill's request to obtain videotapes.124 il argued that the district
court abused its discretion bydenying himthe opportunityto conduct an eviden-
tiary hearing or to conduct discovery.'
"To obtain authorization to conduct discovery, Hl is obliged to 'make []
a specific allegation that shows reason to believe that [he] maybe able to demon-
strate that he is entitled to relief.' 126 The Fourth Circuit concluded that Hill
failed to provide anyjustifiable indication that the videos would prove an entitle-
ment to relief under Hdnxk.Y7 Similarly, Hill failed to make the showing
necessaryto obtain an evidentiaryhearing7'I-Hll failed to point to anyevidence,
which if believed, zadd entitle him to relief."9 "Just as he is unable to demon-
strate that he is entitled to discovery, Hill has failed to make the showing neces-
saryto obtain an evidentiaryhearing. " ' Hll failed to allege that an evidentiary
hearing would establish that his due process rights were violated.' Absent a
specific allegation that would establish a Hdbrxk violation requiring relief, the
court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
discovery or by denying the evidentiaryhearing.' The Fourth Crcuit affirmed
the district court's denial of Hill's discovery claim.'
D. T/hI eAssistane jf Caod Caim
In his IAC claim, i asserted that his lawyers were ineffective when they
called Dr. Edward Burt ("Dr. Burt") to testify during the sentencing phase. 34
The defense sought to establish that il had a genetic condition that caused
neurochemical imbalances in his brain.' Counsel contended, and sought to
establish through expert testimony, that "ill suffered from a genetically-based
serotonin deficiency, which resulted in aggressive impulses."' 36 The lawyers
124. Id at 201.
125. Id
126. Id (alteration in original) (quoting Quesinberry v. Taylor, 162 F.3d 273, 279 (4th CAr.
1998)).
127. Id The court noted that Hil's reasons for requesting the video were speculative because
he had no proof that the videotapes panned the entire courtroom. Id
128. Hi4 339 F.3d at 201.
129. Id; siMcCarver v. Lee, 221 F.3d 583, 598 (4th Cir. 2000) (requiring "facts that, if true,
would entitle [the petitioner] to relief" to obtain an evidentiary hearing).






136. Hl, 339 F.3d at 201-02.
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attempted to establish that after Hill was arrested and incarcerated, he received
medication that controlled these serotonin controlled impulses."' Further,
counsel hoped to persuade the jury that the death penalty was not warranted
because Hill's behavior was caused bya treatable genetic deficiency.'38 Counsel
called Dr. Emil Coccaro to testify about the importance of serotonin in brain
chemistry and how genetics affect serotonin levels.'39 Next, Dr. Bernard
Albiniak, a forensic psyhologist who had performed several spinal taps on Hill,
testified that Hill suffered from a "chronic serotonin deficiency.""0
Finally, the defense called Dr. Burt."' He was expected to testify that he
had prescribed Hill Prozac to treat Hill's serotonin deficiency and that Hill had
responded well to the treatment.14 ' Dr. Burt was expected to explain that Hill's
aggressive behavior and a significant history of violence and suicide in il's
family indicated that his aggressive impulses were a result of a genetic
condition.143 However, while on the stand, Dr. Burt had a mental breakdown
that made it difficult for counsel to establish the information theywere attempt-
ing to convey to the jury.'"
Hl contended that his lawyers were ineffective because they should have
known that Dr. Burt would not be able to testify effectively.14 1 The state court
rejected Hill's claim and concluded that "ill's lawyers were not constitutionally
ineffective in calling [Dr. Burt] as a witness because they had properly investi-
gated him and prepared him for trial." " The district court also denied relief on
the IAC claim because it concluded the state court's ruling was neither "contrary
to" nor an "unreasonable application of" clearly established federal law.
47
The Fourth Grcuit agreed with the district court that the state court's
resolution of this issue was neither "contrary to" nor an "unreasonable applica-
tion of" clearly established federal law.4 Guided by the principles set out in





142. Hl 339 F.3d at 202.
143. Id
144. Id
145. Id Bill contended that his attorneys knew that eight months before trial Dr. Burt had
been arrested for public intoxication. Id This knowledge, coupled with his attorney's decision to
call Dr. Burt to the stand, in Hill's view, caused his attorney's performance to fall below an objective




148. Hi 339 F.3d at 202.
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Stri&lar v Washitn 49 and the cases that followed, the Fourth Grcuit agreed
that the state court was correct in its conclusion that Hill's lawyers were not
constitutionallydefective.' 0 In Stri&La=r the Supreme Court set out the require-
ments for an IAC claim.. A defendant must demonstrate the following:
(1)counsel's performance was defective; and (2) the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. I"2
In this case, the record established that Dr. Burt was competent to testify
and that Hil ls defense team "prepped" him before he was called to the stand. 3
Although counsel knew about Dr. Burt's arrest, theymade a decision that he was
capable of testifying.5 4 The magistrate noted that Dr. Burt's performance was
"unforeseen and unforeseeable"; thus, the defense counsel could not reasonably
have foreseen a breakdown.' The Fourth Crcuit concluded that Fill's attorneys
were not ineffective in putting Dr. Burt on the stand to testify.
6
IV. Appiatzm in Vbgma
A. Habeas Tht)ai,
Hi illustrates that if a state court decides a constitutional claim on the
merits, for purposes of federal habeas corpus, the state court has ruled on the
merits of that constitutional claim even if it did not explicitly say it had done
so.' If the defendant raises a constitutional claim in state court and the state
court does not rule on the merits, then the defendant has not procedurally
defaulted for purposes of federal habeas and may obtain plenary review. If,
however, the defendant raises a constitutional claim in state court and the state
court rules on the merits of the claim, the defendant is not procedurallydefaulted
for federal habeas, but may only obtain deferential review.
149. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
150. Hdi, 339 F.3d at 202-03; sw Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 699-700 (1984)
(holding that Strickland's attorney's were not constitutionally ineffective because the attorneys'
performance did not fall below the "reasonableness standard" and the defendant could not prove
prejudice).
151. HA 339 F.3d at 202.
152. Id (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). A "deficient" performance is one which falls
below the objective reasonableness standard. Sbi/azrl, 466 US. at 688. The prejudice that follows
a deficient performance must be a prejudice where there is a "reasonable probability that; but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id at 694.
153. Hl 339 F.3d. at 203.
154. Id
155. Id
156. Id The court even noted that the magistrate commented that trial counsel could have
been ineffective if they had failed to call Dr. Burt. Id at 203 n.16; stalso Anderson v. Butler, 858
F.2d 16, 18-19 (1st Cr. 1988) (stating that the failure to call an expert could amount to ineffective
assistance of counsel).




The lawyers in Hi//did an excellent job of keeping in touch with their expert
witness and presenting a factually specific case for a continuance. The defense
team, immediatelyupon learning that its expert would be late, notified the court,
explained the circumstances and reasons for the delay, and summarized the
expected testimony." After this, they moved for a continuance."5 9 Defense
counsel should always be prepared to state how the defense case will be preju-
diced if a continuance is not granted.
C C~w~s in the QOxhie ard Capft=
If practitioners believe that the defendant's right to a fair trial might be
prejudiced by the number of uniformed officers in the court complex, they
should create a detailed trial record of such presence. Hil illustrates that a
defendant can only later obtain discoveryin habeas proceedings if he can estab-
lish what the discovered material would show."6 If the number of officers in the
courtroom is a concern, counsel should make a pre-trial motion to exclude
uniformed officers and to exclude officer witnesses from the courtroom during
other witnesses' testimony. 6' At appropriate times during the course of the trial,
for example each day as court is called into session, counsel should put on the
record the number of uniformed officers in the courtroom and their locations.
If a large number of officers come into the courtroom after court is called into
session, counsel are encouraged to ensure that this is properly reflected in the
record.
V. CQndsicn
First, Hi! illustrates that if a state court decides a constitutional claim on the
merits, for purposes of federal habeas corpus, that state court has ruled on the
merits of that constitutional claim even absent language explining it had done
so. Second, trial counsel should be aware of the importance of eing able to
establish that the defense would be prejudiced if the court denies a critical
continuance. Finally, Hil illustrates the importance of creating a trial record of
the number of officers in and around the area of the court proceedings should
there be a H brk situation.
Meghan H Morgan
158. Id at 197.
159. Id
160. Id at 201.
161. Practitioners are encouraged to contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse at (540)
458-8557 for relevant motions.
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